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I Abstract 
 
The European railway market is since 25 years subject to a constant transformation 
process. The EU’s railway packages, bundles of railway specific legislation, initiate 
reforms in a sector that was characterised by decade long national fragmentation and a 
shrinking modal share. National railways used to be run by vertical integrated 
governmental authorities, which were unable to adjust to changes in the market and new 
developments like the unprecedented rise of the individual motor car after World War 
Two. Liberalisation (market opening) and privatisation (franchising private competitors) 
were the key strategies to overhaul the massive and ponderous state-owned as well as state-
controlled railway sector in order to curb waste of public subsidies and worsening train 
service. The main objective is the creation of a single European railway market with a high 
degree of interoperability and competition, similarly to the Single European Sky initiative 
in the civil aviation. 
 
So far three railway packages (2001, 2004 and 2007) have been adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council. A fourth one is since 2013 in the making, whereby the 
technical pillar is closer to an agreement than the highly contested market pillar especially 
for high-speed long-distance passenger service. The rail freight sector was already 
liberalised and enjoys free market access for all competitors since 2007. 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of the railway packages in particular on the 
rail freight transport in the EU Member States. How much influence has the EU legislation 
in a specific policy area, here transport (impact assessment). In order to answer the 
research question a sequential multiple regression was chosen. This method allows adding 
gradually suitable independent variables and dummies in a fixed order to determine their 
impact on the dependent variable rail freight. 
 
The results were humble; the biggest impact on the depended variable had rail passengers 
with a high statistical significance. A negative impact had EU membership with low 
significance. All three railway packages had only a marginal impact without significance. 
Several problems and limitations were faced during the operationalisation and partly 
explain the poor output. 
 
 
Keywords: European railways, railway market, railway packages, reforms, liberalisation 
of a public service, sequential multiple regression. 
 
Word count: 17,680  
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1 Introduction 
This section will provide an overview of the paper’s content and lay out its intention. First, 
the aim and the research questions are explained including their academic relevance; 
second, a definition of the overarching theory of liberalisation is given; third, a historical 
outline of the European railway reform is presented; fourth, the various limitations of the 
study are discussed; and fifth, the disposition of the following sections is illustrated. 
 
The negotiations for a 4th Railway Package (RP) between the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament continue in the first half of 2015. Furthermore so-called trialogues1 
meetings are held for contested issues like the opening of the long-distance passenger 
transport for market competition. The result will be the latest milestone in a succession of 
reform packages over the past 25 years in order to revamp the formerly ailing European 
railway sector. It is the conviction of the Member States (MS) that the old model of a state-
run railway is outdated by modern developments and that liberalisation was the adequate 
answer. 
 
This research paper looks into this long-lasting transformation of the railway sector in 
detail and tries to find a statistical relevant impact of these reform packages on the 
domestic rail freight (cargo) figures in selected Member States since 1988. 
 
1.1 Aim, research question Q and hypotheses H 
Out of the need to reform a public service like the railway transport the RPs guide the 
transformation through rules that apply in every Member State and thus to each national 
railway. These legal acts, initiated by the European Commission and then negotiated 
between the Council and Parliament, form the basis and the reference for the national 
authorities supervising their respective national railway. 
 
Fundamentally this study tries to examine the impact of EU legislation concerning the rail 
freight in the Member States.  
Q1: Did the railway packages have a statistical effect on the railway freight 
in the Member States? And if yes, was it positive or negative and how 
strong was the effect? 
The following hypotheses stem from the research question. They are set within the 
framework of liberalisation and structural reform of the European railway market as 
described in the next section 1.2. 
                                                
1 Describes in EU inter-institutional politics an informal tripartite meeting with the aim of solving political 
blockades attended by representatives of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and 
the European Commission. 
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H02: The EU railway packages had no significant effect on rail freight in the 
Member States. 
H1: By opening the European railway market and enabling competition the 
volume of railway goods in the member states increased. 
 
1.2 Liberalisation, privatisation and marketisation of the railway sector 
When talking about the applied theory of liberalisation and marketisation the following 
section will give an explanation of these concepts. 
 
The term liberalisation in an economic sense refers to a relaxation (removing or reducing) 
of legal restrictions and/or provisions imposed by the state on public services like post, 
telecommunications and transport. Often the ownership of public assets (services, 
organisations, land, buildings, equipment, information and intellectual knowledge) are sold 
or transferred to the private or voluntary sector.3 In the case of European railway the old 
regulations provided that the state railways were the all-encompassing monopolist of train 
service and infrastructure provider in each Member State. That is why liberalisation and 
deregulation often coincidence in terms of opening a market for private companies access 
thus enabling competition.  
 
The provision of transport by a foreign or international private competitor within the 
domestic market is called cabotage. Because of its high initial infrastructure investments 
(large sunken cost) rail transport is considered a natural monopoly for the owner of tracks 
and stations. Therefore a precondition for liberalisation of the railways is the separation of 
infrastructure management (rail network and stations) from transport operation (trains). 
This can be implemented in different degrees (from least to most): single vertically 
integrated company => accounting (bookkeeping) separation => organisational separation 
(separated units within the same organisation) => institutional separation (disconnected 
organisations).4 Thus eliminating the monopoly power and enabling competition in 
transport. On the contrary, competition in rail infrastructure would mean building costly 
parallel tracks between two destinations owned by different companies, amounting to high 
financial market barriers for new competitors. Competition in rail infrastructure would 
produce not only redundant infrastructure but also cause unnecessary investment. 
Therefore only competition in transport is rational and viable in an economic sense. The 
degree of competition can also vary (from least to most): single vertically integrated 
                                                
2 In inferential statistics the null hypothesis usually refers to a general statement that there is no relationship 
between two measured phenomena. 
3 Whitfield (2006), p.4. 
4 Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004), p.15. 
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company (monopoly) => yardstick => franchising => open access.5 Please see table 3 in 
the appendix for rail sector restructuring.  
 
Yardstick competition refers to markets where agents (railway companies) have low 
incentives for promoting productive efficiency thus competition is weak or absent. In this 
case the principal or regulator of the market (state authorities) reimburses agents according 
to their relative performance compared with other agents that offer a similar scope of 
business. This reward mechanism induces a process of competition among the agents. Up 
to the 1970s, the term yardstick competition was used for the situation in which a state-
owned firm competed with privately owned firms. The state-owned firm would serve as 
the benchmark or yardstick.6 
 
Railway franchising, well practised in the UK since the mid 1990s, refers to the process of 
contracting out the operation of passenger or freight rail service by the state (the 
franchisor), as owner of the assets (this can involve both infrastructure and rolling stock, 
depending on the arrangement), through a system of awarding operating licences 
(privilege) based on a contract, after a competitive public tendering, to private companies 
(the franchisees).7 
 
Similar developments like in the railway industry can be found in the civil aviation with an 
established owner and operator for airports (infrastructure) separated from the open 
competition among airlines (transport). As this sector was liberalised earlier in the EU, 
through the so-called the Single European Sky initiative8, it can be seen in some aspects as 
a precursor to the liberalisation of the European railways. 
 
Another dimension of the overarching liberalisation theme is privatisation, which denotes 
the process of transferring ownership of an entity from the public sector (state) to the 
private sector (company). Even though privatisation and liberalisation often go hand in 
hand both are two distinct concepts. For example the liberalisation of the railway market 
led to access of private competitors to the former state monopoly railway network. The 
former state railways were transformed into (holding) companies managed under private 
law but remain partially or completely in government ownership, depending on the 
Member State. It is this discrepancy between genuine 100% private companies and 
governmental holding companies that distort the market to unequal competition of today’s 
European railways. 
                                                
5 Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004), p.15. 
6 Canoy et.al. (2000), p.15-16. 
7 ECMT report: Competitive Tendering of Rail Services (2007), p.9-10, 204. 
8 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/single_european_sky/index_en.htm (ret. 14 Jul 2015). 
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Marketisation is understood as the restructuring process by which market forces are 
imposed on public services, whereas these have traditionally been planned, delivered and 
financed by the state (preference of competition over administration). This enables state 
enterprises to operate as market-oriented firms by changing the legal environment of the 
affected sector. Key elements of this process are the commodification of services and 
infrastructure, the restructuring of the sector for competition and market mechanisms, the 
reorganisation of work as well as jobs to maximise productivity and enabling transfer to 
another employer.9 In the case of railways this has meant the introduction of tendering of 
train operations in a market of competitors. 
 
1.3 A historical outline of the European railways 
The reform of the European railway market was the answer to decades of fragmentation 
and a shrinking share of total transport services. National railways used to be run by 
vertical integrated governmental authorities, which were unable to adjust to changes in the 
market and new developments like the unprecedented rise of the individual motor car after 
World War Two. Liberalisation (market opening) and privatisation (franchising private 
competitors) were the key strategies to overhaul a massive and ponderous state-owned and 
controlled railway sector in order to curb waste of public subsidies and worsening train 
service.  
1.3.1 From the early beginnings to the mid-20th century 
The history of European railways is one of constant change and development. First 
connections between European cities were established in the 1820s and 1830s in England, 
the motherland of the Industrial Revolution, by private companies. This trend spread all 
over the European continent in the following decades of the 19th century and step by step a 
network of railways came into existence. Many small railway lines merged or were bought 
by competitors over time to create bigger and more efficient companies. During the 20th 
century most countries in Europe nationalised their various private railway companies and 
formed a single national railway authority.10 These were vertical integrated and provided 
all services from one source: infrastructure, operation, maintenance, information, 
authorisation and inspection. The governments had realised the potential of the railways 
for military and economic purposes. From then on European rail networks have been 
conceived, managed and regulated only at the national level.11 Those isolated national 
applications led to a patchwork of poorly interoperable networks, existing side by side. 
                                                
9 Whitfield (2006), p.4. 
10 For example: British Railways created in 1948; French SNCF in 1938; Deutsche Reichsbahn created 
through merger of individual German state railways in 1920; and Spanish  RENFE in1941. 
11 Laperrouza and Finger (2009), p.2. 
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Hence rail gauge, electrification, signalling, train regulation, operational charges, traffic 
mix and density differed widely among European countries even if they were neighbours.12 
As consequence of two World Wars and especially during the Cold War only little 
attention was paid to cross-border transport. The limited international traffic that existed 
was expensive because of technical hurdles and administrative burdens. Each crossing had 
to be based on a bilateral agreement as there was no supranational railway entity.  
 
During this time the most common structure of the railway sector in many European 
countries was a single public authority, in charge of managing both the rail infrastructure 
and the train operation, an all-embracing state monopoly.13 As such they were often used 
for political objectives (e.g. investment and employment). Even if certain passenger 
services became unprofitable they had to be maintained for political reasons and decisions 
(e.g. public service obligations). The authorities were inflexible and often too cumbersome 
to adapt in reasonable time to changes in passenger demand. This all resulted in an 
indebtedness of the national railways over the curse of decades. For example, the two 
former national railways of West Germany (Deutsche Bundesbahn) and East Germany 
(Deutsche Reichsbahn) accumulated together in about €35bn of debt by 1993, which 
would have increased to staggering €190bn in 2003 without any reform being 
implemented.14 High debt levels relative to the national public budget were attained in 
most European states at the end of the 1980s. Frequent political interference conserved this 
situation with low ambitions for necessary reforms.15 
 
Even though most neighbouring systems were to some extent interconnected (mostly 
historic junctions), the whole European network remained highly inefficient and especially 
un-coordinated above the national level. It needed to overcome the national level of 
organisation as barrier of further integration. First attempts were made in the 1950s by the 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) which led to the introduction of a 
Common Transport Policy (CTP) in the Treaty of Rome of 1957.16 The CTP was 
considered as a core competence of the newly established European Economic 
Community. First measures were to modernise the existing rail infrastructure, to stimulate 
cross-border traffic and to improve the financial situation of the state railways. But failing 
to achieve these objectives for decades made the dissatisfied EP to involve the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), which led in 1985 to the so-called ‘inactivity verdict’.17 This initial 
event was followed by the Single European Act (1986) which laid down the basis for the 
                                                
12 Presentation by Stephen Perkins in October 2010, International Transport Forum, p.5. 
13 Laperrouza and Finger (2009), p.3. 
14 Große Anfrage Die Linke (Nov 2014), p.6: DM70bn in 1993 and DM380bn in 2003 (prediction). 
15 Laperrouza and Finger (2009), p.4. 
16 Laperrouza and Finger (2009), p.4. 
17 Schipper (2009), p.12. 
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establishment of the Single Market, including transport services. Furthermore the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 reinforced the political, institutional and budgetary foundations 
of the CTP.18 
1.3.2 The gradual liberalisation from the mid-20th century 
As described above for much of the 20th century European railways have suffered from 
financial losses (due to unprofitable services), inefficient management (cumbersome 
authorities) and insufficient commercial outlook (relying mostly on state subsidies to stay 
viable, accumulation of debts).19 This poor testimony has given incentive to EU Member 
States (MS) to reform their national rail sector in the past two and a half decades guided by 
the European Commission’s railway packages. The reforms had several overarching goals:  
 reducing the need for state subsidies and removing corporate debt (sustainable 
finances),  
 enhancing productivity as well as efficiency of the railway system by assurance of 
third-party access to the infrastructure (opening the market for competition),20  
 increasing the competitiveness by separation of infrastructure management from 
transport operations (end of natural monopoly of state railways),21 
 introduction of independent national railway oversight and regulation authorities 
for capacity allocation and access to essential facilities,22  
 foundation of a European Railway Agency (ERA) promoting interoperability and 
mutual recognition of technical as well as safety standards.23 
 the integration of the national railway networks into a single European railway area  
However, the pressure to reform and liberalise the railway sector did not only came from 
its own poor state. Rail traffic was losing ground significantly to road traffic because of the 
domination of the car in daily life (increased degree of individual motorisation), the 
expansion of the road network, the poor international railway cooperation, changing 
demands from the market, and technical incompatibilities at border crossings. From 1970 
to 1995 the modal split for rail passenger services and rail freight services within the EU-
15 declined by more than 40 percent and almost 58 percent, respectively, compared to 
other transportation modes, like road, air or sea transport.24  
 
One of the basic principles of the liberalisation was the separation of infrastructure, which 
included the railway tracks, signals, overhead wires, tunnels, bridges, level crossings and 
mostly the stations, from operations, that is the passenger or commercial freight rolling 
                                                
18 European Commission: Evaluation of the CTP of the EU (August 2009, Brussels), p.7. 
19 Eisenkopf (2006), p.292. 
20 Nash (2008), p.61. 
21 Wetzel (2008), p.4. 
22 Presentation by Stephen Perkins in October 2010, International Transport Forum, p.4. 
23 Laperrouza and Finger (2009), p.4. 
24 European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 2003, 2007. 
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stock (i.e. trains and wagons). It is specified in the first Railway Package (e.g. Dir. 
2001/12/EC) that both need separate profit and loss accounts as well as separate balance 
sheets. A transfer of public funds between the two is not allowed. Furthermore, if both 
remain within the undertaking then as distinct divisions, otherwise each of them needs to 
be managed by a separate entity.25 The separation is meant to facilitate competition for 
train service on an independently maintained track network. This progressive market 
opening for new operators was assisted by rules regarding the fair allocation of time slots 
and the pricing of infrastructure use, administered by an independent regulator (e.g. Dir. 
2001/14/EC).26  
 
The new operators also include former state monopolists conducting service in a 
neighbouring MS, for example SNCF in Germany. A new regulatory structure was 
introduced called national supervisory authorities (NSA), which were often just outsourced 
from the former state monopoly. These NSA were later constrained in their area of activity 
due to the new European Railway Agency (ERA) established in 2004 by the second 
railway package (Reg. 881/2004/EC).  
 
The ERA is one of the many agencies of the European Union and its headquarters is 
located in Valenciennes, France. Its mandate is the creation of a competitive European 
railway area, by increasing the interoperability of national railway systems through mutual 
recognition and harmonisation of technical standards. At the same time the ERA ensures 
the required level of technical and working safety.27 The ERA is responsible for drafting of 
the Technical Standards on Interoperability (TSIs) for the whole EU market. 
 
The EC’s new regulatory regime creating and supporting an open access railway market 
was implemented through five important steps over time (please see an overview in table 
18 in the appendix). Previous EU/EC legislation concerned railways only in a wider sense 
as part of (public) services,28 for instance that governments should refrain from 
interference in market mechanisms by providing subsidies except under specific 
conditions.29  
 
The first step was the so-called ‘mother’ Directive 91/440/EEC from 1991 which pooled 
after long negotiations several earlier legal proposals to reform the European railways. The 
intention was to lay down the foundations for the creation of a single European railway 
                                                
25 Council Directive No 91/440/EEC, Section 3, Article 6 (1 + 2). 
26 Laperrouza and Finger (2009), p.5. 
27 European Railway Agency (ERA) Annual Activity Report 2013, p.7. 
28 Three important regulations: 1191/69 on Public Service Obligations, 1192/69 on Normalisation of 
Accounts, 1107/70 on Aids to Transport. 
29 Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004), p.1. 
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area.30 It required MS to break-up their vertically integrated national (state) railway 
monopolies (accounting separation of infrastructure and operation). Additionally railway 
companies from all MS were allowed to run services on any other MSs rail infrastructure, 
both for passengers and goods. This first directive was followed up by two additional 
directives in 1995: Dir. 95/18/EC set out a framework and guidelines for the way in which 
MS provide licenses to operate railway companies on their network (requiring appropriate 
financial capacity, professional qualifications, insurance and safety certification); and Dir. 
95/19/EC set out the framework for the installation of state supervisory bodies that control 
and regulate the allocation of line possessions to that said railway companies, and the 
charges for using the track (based on non-discriminatory rules like train kilometres, speed, 
time, axle weight, etc.).31 In 2001 the EC published a White Paper32 on the future of 
transport in Europe. The ambition was to revitalise the ailing transport sector by calling for 
clearer separation of infrastructure from operations, at least separate divisions 
(organisational separation), for a gradual extension of access rights and for transparent as 
well as non-discriminatory infrastructure charges. The schedule then intended the full 
liberalisation of cross-border freight service by 2007 followed by (domestic) passenger 
service in 2012.33  
 
The second step was the first so-called ‘railway package34’ adopted in 2001 with the 
objective to further promote market opening and to create a single European railway area. 
It was deemed necessary by the Commission because of the unsatisfactory implementation 
of its previous directives. The package consisted of three Directives ensuring non-
discriminatory infrastructure access (2001/12/EC on the development of European 
railways amending Directive 91/440/EEC, 2001/13/EC on railway licensing amending 
Directive 95/18/EC and Directive 2001/14/EC on capacity allocation, railway 
infrastructure charging and safety certification); and the directive 2001/16/EC on the 
interoperability of rail systems through implementation of common technical 
specifications.35  
 
The third step was the ‘second package’ of measures adopted in April 2004. It provided 
instructions on rail safety, an amendment of the interoperability Directives 96/46/EC and 
2001/16/EC in order to gradually extend the scope of interoperability to cover the entire 
rail network and the setting up of a European Railway Agency (ERA). The ERA is 
supposed to provide technical support for the work on interoperability and safety of the 
                                                
30 CER Annual Report 2013-2014, p.73. 
31 Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004), p.5. 
32 White papers are official EU policy documents containing an official set of proposals in specific policy 
areas and calling for community action. 
33 EC White Paper on Transport (2001). 
34 Package, because it was a bundle of directives and not a single one like in 1991. 
35 Eisenkopf (2006), p.292. 
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European railway sector.36 In 2007 the third ‘railway package’ marked the fourth step. It 
introduced open access rights for international transport services. At the end of 2012 the 
recast of the first railway package, amending its various directives, was approved by the 
EP together with the Council and hence published in the Official Journal of the EU.37  
 
In January 2013 a ‘fourth package’, the fifth step, was proposed by the EC38. This package 
includes standards and authorisation for rolling stock; ensuring workforce skills; 
independent rail infrastructure management; cutting administrative costs for rolling stock 
approvals (technical pillar);39 and the full liberalisation of commercial domestic passenger 
services until December 2019 (market pillar).40 It further includes greater power to the 
ERA for the governance of the railway system e.g. to issue safety certificates and rolling 
stock authorisation in the whole of the EU instead of national agencies in order to reduce 
administrative costs and to make rail more environmental-friendly.41  
 
So far reports have been written on measures to improve domestic rail passenger services 
by opening up public service contracts to more competition, giving operators fairer access 
to infrastructure and harmonizing safety certification to improve interoperability and get 
innovative new rolling stock on the rails faster. Members of the EP’s transport committee 
approved these reports in February 2014 42 and thereby gave the mandates to the 
Parliament negotiating team in foresight to start negotiations with the Council.43 At the end 
of 2014 the market pillar, which aims to further realise the market opening (especially for 
international high-speed passenger service), was under heavy negotiations in the Council44 
due to outdated vested national interests; whereas the technical pillar, which aims to 
simplify and harmonise thousands of national technical and safety rules, seems to cause 
less disputes in the trialogue negotiations of the first half of 2015.45  
 
But the EC was not the only pioneer in railway liberalisation, some MS preceded its effort 
from 2001 (1st railway package) and even from 1991 (1st directive on railways). Please see 
table 17 in the appendix for a timeline of country reforms, railway legislation and EU 
white papers on transport. Foremost Sweden, which was the first country in Europe to 
reform its railway market. The Transport Policy Act of 1988 demanded a complete 
                                                
36 Eisenkopf (2006), p.293. 
37 Press release of the Council: Brussels, 19 June 2012; 11543/12; PRESSE 273. 
38 Press release of Commissioner Siim Kallas: European railways at a junction (pub. 30 Jan 2013). 
39 EC press release: EP adopts equivocal first reading position on 4th RP (pub. 26 Feb 2014). 
40 Railway Gazette: Compliance Verification Clause unlocks the 4th RP (pub. 30 Jan 2013). 
41 UNIFE: The 4th RP's Technical Pillar: a top priority for the railway sector (pub. 3 Dec 2013). 
42 Euroactive: MEPs vote on changes to fourth railway package (published 27 Feb 2014). 
43 Press release by the EP: 4th RP: lifting market entry barriers to improve passenger services (pub. 17 Dec 
’13) 
44 The Parliament Magazine: Ministers discuss 4th railway package (published 10 Oct 2014). 
45 EC: Simplifying procedures to achieve a Single European Railway Area (pub. 5 June 2014). 
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separation of infrastructure from operations, thus a gradual split-up (institutional 
separation) of Statens Järnvägar (Swedish State Railways), a vertically and horizontally 
integrated state monopoly, into separate public limited companies. The transport act of 
1988 and the following amending acts resulted in: the transfer of the track network to 
Banverket (Swedish Rail Administration, state authority)in 1988; the liberalisation of 
freight operations in 1996; the transfer of the passenger transport to SJ (the government-
owned train operator) in 2000; the transfer of railway stations and other buildings attached 
to the railway network to Jernhusen (a government enterprise) in 2001; 46 and the market 
opening of the passenger service in 2012.47 Furthermore it determined the empowerment of 
regional authorities for ordering and funding of regional train services. All train operators 
in Sweden pay track access charges (based on marginal costs for maintenance) to the track 
authority Trafikverket (Swedish Transport Administration) since its foundation in 2010, 
which itself is responsible for the long-term infrastructure planning for all kinds of 
transport.48 
 
This was followed by the UK in 1993 with the passing of the Railways Act49 which led to 
the gradual privatisation (1994 till 1997) of the former state-owned railway company 
British Rail. This was implemented by franchising all passenger services to individual 
private operators via competitive tendering.50 The rail infrastructure of British Rail was 
taken over by Railtrack (a group of private companies) until its bankruptcy in 2002 and 
was then transferred to the state-controlled non-profit company Network Rail,51 following 
a serious accident attributed to poor infrastructure maintenance.52 
 
The German railway sector was fundamentally reformed in 1994 and open access to the 
rail network was gradual granted to third parties. The state-owned West German national 
carrier Deutsche Bundesbahn was consolidated with the former East-German 
governmental rail undertaking Deutsche Reichsbahn, restructured and re-established as 
Deutsche Bahn (DB, German Railway). The DB is a government-held holding company 
managed under private law consisting of semi-autonomous divisions for cargo, passenger 
service and infrastructure. Besides the DB, which combines the train operations and rail 
infrastructures of the former East and West railways, the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (EBA, 
Federal Railway Office) was founded, a government agency inspecting and authorising the 
majority of German domestic railway infrastructure and rolling stock companies. 
Furthermore the Bundeseisenbahnvermögen (BEV, Federal Railway Property) was 
                                                
46 Amadeus: European Rail Deregulation (pub. 5 Feb 2010). 
47 Alexandersson et. al. (2013), p.308. 
48 ECMT report: Competitive Tendering of Rail Services (2007), p.167 and 168. 
49 "Railways Act 1993". The Railways Archive. 
50 ECMT report: Competitive Tendering of Rail Services (2007), p.9. 
51 Network Rail closer to Railtrack takeover". BBC News. (pub. 18 Sep 2002). 
52 Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004), p.18. 
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installed, a special fund under public law for all former federal railway agents, the 
combined legacy debts and the non-essential railway estates.53 Two years later, in 1996, 
the regional and local rail passenger market was changed, as well. The responsibility for 
regional rail transport organisation and funds were transferred from the federal to the state 
level (“regionalisation”). Public procurement, tendering and franchising (competition for 
the market) were introduced in the opened rail-freight market and the regional rail 
passenger market.54 Long-distance service, though, remains a monopoly of DB until today 
with very few exceptions. 
 
France started in 1997 to separate the rail infrastructure from its national state-owned 
railway company SNCF. RFF, a new state-owned company, was founded which owns and 
maintains the French national railway network. Despite this separation SNCF kept 
ownership of all French train stations in an own division ‘Gares & Connexions’. 
Furthermore its SNCF Infra division carries out track and other infrastructure maintenance 
on behalf of RFF.  
 
To sum up, one can observe that three different models for separation of infrastructure and 
operation have emerged in Europe: 1) complete separation (e.g. UK, SE), 2) holding 
company (e.g. DE) and 3) separation of key powers (e.g. FR). Please see table 5 for a 
visualisation. 
 
The EC remains the driving force in reforming the sector; nowadays MS seem reluctant to 
lose control over their national networks. The transposition of EU legislation into domestic 
law is delayed in many countries. MS differ in terms of how they have interpreted 
requirements set by the legislation. The majority of countries only implemented the EU’s 
minimum requirements. In order to address this non-compliance the EC repeatedly notified 
MS for failing to implement EU legislation.55 
 
The railway packages (RP) are composed of directions with a specific policy goal, only 
few regulations were set up as well. That means that the MS themselves are responsible for 
the transposition of the directive by their national legal means in contrast to the direct 
effect of regulations into national legislation. But not all MS are implementing the new EU 
rules at the same time and to the same extent. Countries with a more liberalised market like 
the UK, Sweden and Germany had a stronger entry of new rail freight firms in comparison 
to less liberalised markets like in Spain, France and Denmark; where the incumbent rail 
freight operators still reach a market share of 100%. But other entry barriers like the 
                                                
53 In German: Große Anfrage der Fraktion Die Linke zu 20 Jahre Bahnreform, Nov 2014., p.2. 
54 ECMT report: Competitive Tendering of Rail Services (2007), p.141. 
55 Laperrouza and Finger (2009), p.6. 
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national right of cabotage make it hard for new freight firms. Cabotage refers to the 
transport of goods or passengers between two points in the same country by a foreign 
company.56 
 
Generally speaking the domestic freight market is open to competition across the EU since 
January 2007, the international freight followed soon after. But the domestic and 
international passenger market remains a patchwork of access.57 For example in Germany 
the regional and local train services are ordered and financed by the Länder (States) 
governments, the public procurement is carried out Europe-wide and thus several 
competing companies are present in the market besides the former national monopolist 
Deutsche Bahn. This is not the case for long-distance and cross-border (international) 
trains, only DB is operating them in Germany or in a joint-venture with another 
neighbouring former state monopolist for instance between Paris and Frankfurt 
(DB/SNCF) or between Vienna and Munich (DB/ÖBB).58 With the partial opening of the 
passenger market in 2010, a number of operators have applied for slots outside of their 
home markets. 
 
Due to its historical and technical heterogeneity, the deregulation of the railway sector in 
the MS has been driven by different types of economic, institutional and legal goals. The 
UK wanted to pursue a comprehensive liberal market agenda, whereas Sweden’s key 
concerns were the need to find investments in the railway sector and to increase efficiency 
through competition. Other countries like Portugal and France initially only acted in 
accordance with the new EU legislation. Despite these divergent paths of liberalisation, 
one can nonetheless find a number of common significant changes that occurred in the 
European railway landscape since the 1990s (table 4 in the appendix).59 
 
Conclusively the objective of a single European railway area is far from reached. 
Problematic are the two major conditions, the liberalisation of the national markets and the 
creation of an interoperable network. Both are potentially contradictory, because 
liberalisation requires specific regulation for economic and financial performance, and 
interoperability requires specific regulation for technical and operational performance. 
Achieving technical interoperability results in high and immediate cost to railway 
operators and infrastructure managers without generating major returns in the short-term. 
Another factor of the dragging liberalisation progress is the recurrent unwillingness of MS 
to transpose and implement European regulation on time because of national reluctance to 
                                                
56 Eisenkopf (2006), pp.293f. 
57 Railway Gazette: An open passenger market beckons (published 19 Feb 2008). 
58 Railway Gazette: An open passenger market beckons (published 19 Feb 2008). 
59 Laperrouza and Finger (2009), p.7. 
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hand over control and authority. As a consequence the European railway sector remains 
fragmented on several levels: 
1) Technical: interoperability is difficult due to the complexity of the difference of 
technical standards, therefore interoperability is operated first and tested on new 
high-speed lines and along a number of major corridors, conventional rail service 
will follow; 
2) Financial: the financing of many railway operators remains a patchwork between 
government subsidies and EU together with national authorities; 
3) Organisational: the former vertically integrated monopolies have been unbundled 
and are under competitive and performance pressure; the centrally-controlled 
railways are increasingly decentralised and run by markets (passenger demand); 
ownership too is being transformed from one/few actors to several actors; at times 
public ownership is replaced by private or public-private arrangements.  
4) Administrative/legal: obeying the subsidiarity principle, national railway 
legislations are diverse both in terms of their design and implementation.60  
 
The creation of an integrated European railway area also calls for improved 
“interoperability” – or technical compatibility - of infrastructure, rolling stock, signalling 
and other subsystems of the rail system, as well as less complex procedures for the 
authorisation of use of rolling stock across the European Union's rail network. Over 100 
years of national rail networks have developed different technical specifications for 
infrastructure. Different gauge widths, electrification standards and safety and signalling 
systems all make it more difficult and more costly to run a train from one country to 
another. Specific EU legislation exists to promote interoperability and overcome such 
differences. 
 
The European Railway Agency plays a central role in promoting interoperability and 
harmonising technical standards, a process in which cooperation between EU Member 
States and rail stakeholders is essential.61 The diversity of signalling systems in Member 
States has long been recognised as a barrier to international rail traffic. Member States 
have committed themselves to the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS). 
ERTMS creates a single Europe-wide standard for train control and command systems 
(CCS). The two main components of ERTMS are the European Train Control System 
(ETCS, a standard for in-cab train control), and GSM-R (the GSM mobile communications 
standard for railway operations).62 In the years to come, ERTMS will play a major role as 
the common European signalling and train control system. ERTMS implementation is 
                                                
60 Laperrouza and Finger (2009), p.8f. 
61 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/interoperability/ (ret. 7 Jul 2015). 
62 ERA: Final Report TSI CCS Scope Extension by Wouter Malfait from 14 May 2014, p.11. 
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covered by a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Railway sector and the 
European Commission in 2005.63 
 
1.4 Limitations 
The paper concentrates on the railway freight in the EU. Hence, the results should 
primarily be seen in the light of the freight sector and not in general for the entire railway 
sector.  
 
The search for suitable and reliable data over the whole period of time (1988 to 2013) was 
difficult. The IVs (infra_inv and rail_pax) are not ideal as control variables for the DV but 
were chosen out of the lack of alternatives in the available data sources. 
 
A lot of data is not freely available. In addition the available data panels providing the base 
for the statistical analysis were not complete, for instance single missing values per 
country; but also whole years without data entries. As the data is not complete it may offer 
difficulties in providing complete results. In general, “[a] researcher should always keep in 
mind that the results of research are only as good as the quality of the data.”64  
 
This paper limits its research to the EU’s transport policy legal acts (railway packages) and 
their direct impact on the railway freight. Therefore the obligatory transposition of EU 
directions (which outnumber regulations by far) into national law according to article 288 
TFEU, especially its quality and on-time completion are a matter of the member states and 
hence excluded for reasons of simplifications in this study. Implementation issues and 
delays in the MS are not covered and not considered by this study. 
 
Furthermore the number of EU countries was reduced to 23, excluding Cyprus and Malta, 
which have no railways at all, as well as Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg because of no 
relevant rail freight transport (for more information see section 3.2). This of course means 
a reduction in the overall coverage of the EU.  
 
There is no control group of countries who are not in the EU but have a significant rail 
freight sector that underwent reforms like in Europe. This thesis looks exclusively at the 
development in the EU, further studies could take a global perspective and include non-EU 
countries in their analysis and compare the results. 
 
                                                
63 CER: Towards a Primary European Rail Freight Network, October 2007, p.26. 
64 Gujarati (2004), p.30. 
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1.5 Disposition 
Following this first part of introductory words about the aim of the paper and the history of 
the European railways, the second part offers an outline of selected previous research. The 
third part explains the research design, the variables, the used data panel and the applied 
methods. The fourth part presents descriptive and inferential statistics of the sequential 
multiple regression. Finally part five draws conclusions from the results and gives 
suggestions about possible further research. 
 
 
2 Literature review 
This section looks into previous research on the reform of the European railways and 
presents a selected literature review. It concludes with a resume on how this thesis fits into 
previous research and how it is relevant for it. 
 
An economic assessment of the opening of the rail freight market, according to Eisenkopf 
(professor of economics), has to answer the question of the consequences of the 
liberalisation for the rail freight sector and the economy as a whole. Did the efficiency and 
the competitiveness of the rail freight sector improve and did the liberalisation stabilise or 
increase the market share of railways in the freight market.65 The economic expectation of 
the railway liberalisation were set high by the EC, which nonetheless had to confess that its 
targets, especially in the freight traffic have not been meet.  
 
A fundamental problem remains the dominance of the former state monopolies in the 
market share. They often remained the infrastructure owner and made huge profits of the 
high track charges from new competitors. But these new competitors have driven down the 
prices for rail cargo because of a more efficiently and attractive service for their customers. 
Eisenkopf is convinced that open access to the freight market will boost competition for 
incumbent railway firms as new ones will enter. Problems may arise from dominant 
competitors preferring the most profitable services, leaving the less profitable to their 
smaller competitors. This “cherry picking” could force out new entries due to lack of 
revenue, which would hamper the competition. Another negative scenario of intramodal 
competition is the entering of a big state-owned railway in adjacent markets and by 
economies of scale pushing out smaller private rail operators. Inevitably the market will be 
in motion by additional competitors and consequential experience a trend of concentration. 
Namely mergers and acquisitions, which can lead to higher efficiency but at the same time 
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MAES│University of Gothenburg Sascha Brose
 
21/65 
 
strengthen the market dominance of big competitors buying smaller ones and thus 
undermining the desired competition.66 
 
Another dimension of the rail freight market liberalisation is the further integration of the 
national markets to a Single European Market facilitating the free flow of goods, services, 
persons and capital. National monopolies on infrastructure and operation, Eisenkopf 
argues, hamper free trade across the union and create unnecessary trade barriers.67  
 
Eisenkopf continues by examining in detail the legal instruments that open up the market 
and enable competition, the railway packages. These packages are part of the EU’s vision 
of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).68 They aim for “[...] competition in rail transport 
markets and the integration of formerly separated and closed national markets. It is the 
integration goal which brings the [EU] as lawmaker into play. [EU] law has to define 
access rights on the level of directives. Directives are addressed to Member States, which 
have to transform them into their national law. The legal process takes place on three 
levels: creation of Community law, transformation of directives into national law and 
implementation of national law.”69 Eisenkopf states that “the liberalisation goal can only 
be attained if the different kinds of entry barriers are successfully tackled.” He therefore 
dissects the ‘legal tool box’ of the railways liberalisation, the directives and regulations of 
the RPs.  
 
The objective target of the “Second Railway Package” from 2004 was, according to 
Eisenkopf, the free access to infrastructure for international rail freight services by January 
2006 and the liberalisation of cabotage (transport services by foreign companies in 
domestic areas) by 2007.70  
 
Georg Jarzembowski, in his role as MEP, explains the evolution of European railway 
legislation and points out two core obstacles of the liberalisation. First, “[t]ypically, the 
national governments were, and partly still are, the owners of national railway companies 
that control the national railway networks and that at the same time run the operating 
services. For that reason the Member States were, and partly still are, reluctant to accept 
the principle of the single internal market for the railway sector.”71 Secondly , “[a]lthough 
in the now applicable co-decision procedure of the European railway legislation the 
                                                
66 Eisenkopf (2006), p.294. 
67 Eisenkopf (2006), p.296. 
68 The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) is a genuinely European instrument aimed at supporting the 
development of high-performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the 
field of energy, telecommunications and transport. (=> europa.eu). 
69 Eisenkopf (2006), p.296. 
70 Eisenkopf 2006, p.292. 
71 Jarzembowski 2006, p.298. 
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Member States decide all directives together with the European Parliament, some MS are 
slow to transpose the European law into their respective national laws. The failure to 
implement European law both within the required timeframe and, occasionally, also in 
substance might also be considered as intent to dodge the new European provisions and 
thereby to prolong unfair competition positions for the national railway companies.”72 The 
European Commission, as the guardian of the European Treaties, has to watch over the 
implementation of European law by the Member States and, if necessary, take action. In 
line with this responsibility, argues Jarzembowski, in 2006 the Commission published a 
report on the implementation record of the first railway package, in an effort to put more 
pressure on the MS.  
 
Furthermore certain principles of railway liberalisation are neglected. Current legislation, 
for example, does not oblige the MS to separate the networks (rails) and the operations 
(trains) into independent companies, but only to have separate accounting for the network 
infrastructure and for the operational services (subdivided into passenger and freight) 
within one company.  Instead the opening of the national railway networks (liberalisation), 
according to Jarzembowski, should mean that train operating companies (TOC), whether 
state-owned or private and from whichever MS, must be granted the right of access to the 
national networks without any national restrictions. In this regard Dir. 2004/51/EC 
completed the internal market for freight services from the year 2007 on. The Dir. obliged 
MS to allow any railway company to operate cross-border or national freight services in 
the entire European Union. This is not the case for passenger service yet.73  
 
Jarzembowski also refers to new opportunities for the traditional national railway 
companies, “to overcome the old national borders of action and horizons and to develop 
into European players.” He views the success of the liberalisation in the aviation sector in 
recent years as a good role model. The liberalisation brought growth and employment; new 
companies emerged and added service for customers. In general the private aviation 
industry has become more cost-efficient, more customer-oriented, the fares on average 
went down (making it affordable to new user groups), and the usage of this transport mode 
increased significantly. In this sense Jarzembowski believes “[...] that especially in the 
long-distance cross-border freight services the active railway companies have great 
chances to gain more customers and more transport volume.” Railway transport will 
become more competitive compared to road transport and change the modal split back in 
favour of the railway sector.  
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A precondition to be able to seize the aforementioned opportunities is the reorganisation of 
the current TOCs. Following Jarzembowski’s advice, the companies “[...] need to 
restructure their patterns of investment and employment. They should clearly decide in 
which way they want to offer services in the freight, long-distance passenger and regional 
passenger services in their Member State and in the European Union.” Member States who 
are owner of railway companies have to supply their companies with the necessary capital 
for new investments and for the restructuring process. In case of strict austerity measures 
by the government a partly or total privatisation of said TOCs is recommended. Railway 
companies are advised by Jarzembowski “[...] to make up their minds whether they want to 
achieve the necessary European dimension by growing on their own, by buying up or 
merging with other companies and/or by establishing alliances with other companies either 
generally or on certain European corridors.” 
 
The less liberalised and strong contested passenger rail, especially the high-speed long-
distance cross-border service, still remains outside the common internal market. An 
agreement between the protectionists MS could not be reached in the Third Railway 
Package (RP). Consequently Jarzembowski rightly predicts the “[...] need for an Fourth RP 
to regulate this last subject of the European [legislative] framework.” more than 20 years 
after the advent of the liberalisation.74 
 
Johannes Ludewig75 argues that the market liberalisation of European railways was the 
right way to go, but emphasises the need for more measures in order to achieve the long 
called-for modal shift from road transport to the cleaner and safer rail transport. The 
following two other vital policy instruments are indispensable to create a level playing 
field between transport modes (road and rail): a fair infrastructure pricing and more 
investments in new infrastructure. In the case of freight transport the benefits of 
liberalisation are already evident; according to the EC 2006 report on implementation of 
the 1st RP the rail freight market shares have stabilised since 2001. This marks the first 
time that the decline of the railways share in the total market of freight transport has 
stopped in decades; for example in Western Europe from 32 % in 1970 to 15 % in 2006. 
Since the launch of the RPs in 2001 the market share of rail freight has stabilised and 
traffics are increasing in absolute terms. Furthermore the restructuring of the TOCs 
resulted in impressive figures in productivity gains of more than 150 %. The achievements 
of passenger service in contrast do not appear as successful because it follows different and 
more complicated rules with higher stakes from the MS involved.76 
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75 Executive Director of the Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER). 
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Fair transport infrastructure pricing means fair and efficient charges for all transport 
modes, it includes external costs of transport (costs for congestion, air pollution, climate 
change, accidents, noise, etc.), and should be based on the “polluter pays” principle instead 
of the conventional “user pays” principle. Switzerland is a good example where “[...] a fair 
pricing policy can have a radical impact on the ability of rail to compete with road along 
international corridors, as well as on the financing of transport infrastructure.”77 
 
“[P]revious investment policy, reflected in decades of underinvestment in rail, [...]” needs 
to be reversed in order to achieve the modal shift from road to rail. According to Ludewig 
the revenues generated by a fair infrastructure charging “[...] should be used as a source for 
cross-modal financing of new railway infrastructure.”78 The EU can help MS’ investment 
decisions by referring to the commonly defined Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-
T) to create the necessary new lines, expand existing lines and reduce the number of traffic 
bottlenecks. Recent reductions in the TEN-T budget at EU level and further cut-backs in 
national transport budgets are ignoring the needs for more investment in the face of rising 
transport volume predicted for the next decade.79 
 
Werner Rothengatter80 underlines the development gap between the still fragmented and 
national scattered European railways in contrast to free European lorries and passenger 
cars moving across borders without interruption, who can refill their tank everywhere and 
follow widely standardised international signs, regulations and signals. The aviation sector 
already displays a high degree of internationalisation and standardisation in form of 
common rules for piloting and traffic control as well as a common communications 
language. “[T]he reality for railway systems is completely different.” states Rothengatter. 
Fundamental technical aspects such as track gauge, control systems or electrical power 
supply differ with one MS to another, resulting in time-consuming and inefficient border 
traffic; which is the biggest disadvantage compared to road and air transport. Because of 
their military importance and hostile relation between various European countries, railways 
have for a long-time been treated as national treasure/secret resulting in a history of 
heterogeneity leading to the current fragmentation: a “[...] European railway system 
according to national flags.”81 
 
In the times of horse carriages and small ships on inland waterways, roughly until the 
Second World War, the railways were the most competitive mode of transport for mass 
goods on long distances, but with the rise of road vehicles this position was lost and a long 
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79 Ludewig 2006, p.306. 
80 Prof. of Economics, Head of the Institute of Economic Policy Research, University of Karlsruhe. 
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decline followed. The market for road freight transport was liberalised by a European 
Court of Justice ruling in 1985. This process got completed in 1998 by granting cabotage 
(transport services of foreign companies within domestic areas) to road haulage companies 
across the European Union. Rothengatter, however, points out that “[i]n reality the road 
haulage companies and the forwarders had already begun this process years in advance and 
won big market shares through better logistic quality at lower prices, in particular on the 
rapidly growing international transport market. At the same time the railways stagnated, 
lost market shares and increased their [financial] deficits as well as the corresponding 
subsidies provided by the state.”82 This continued despite the introduction of first measures 
to reform the European railways, namely Dir. 91/440/EEC from 199183, until the year 
2000/2001. 
 
Rothengatter emphasises that interoperability is not just a technical side-topic of the 
common railway development but rather an important cornerstone of its revitalisation. 
Moreover interoperability is a pre-condition for intra-modal competition (train company A 
competes with train company B on the same network) that fosters productivity and 
innovation. Interoperability “[...] lead[s] to better capacity use on the tracks and to lower 
transport costs.” Modern big freight companies like the European (mainly German) DB 
Schenker Rail (formerly known as Railion) makes more than 50% of their turnover from 
cross-border transport were interoperability between national rail systems is essential. 
Exactly this international bundled transport over long distances is the natural market 
segment for railways, according to Rothengatter.84 Bundling or consolidation in freight 
traffic generally refers to the process of transporting goods with different destinations 
together during part of their journey in a common vehicle (like lorry or train) or in a 
transferable unit like a intermodal container.85 Besides poor interoperability, insufficient 
common licensing and the slow adoption of a common train control system called ETCS 
(European Train Control System) by the MS are the main hurdles of further progress in 
creating a common railway market.  
 
This paper is part of and was inspired by a wider series of academic papers analysing the 
development of the European railways and its rapid transformation in the past 25 years. 
Many authors draw comparisons between the different liberalisation levels in various 
Member States, investigated the liberalisation in one MS, looked at the long-distance 
passenger rail service in Europe, the rail regulatory reform in Europe, or examined the 
productivity growth in European railways; but none looked specifically at the freight 
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85 Kreutzberger 2010, p.160. 
MAES│University of Gothenburg Sascha Brose
 
26/65 
 
railway sector. To the authors knowledge no similar study or approach has been published, 
examining specifically the impact of the Railway Packages on rail freight in the EU. This 
research could add to literature by offering an impact assessment of European legislation 
and to measure its efficiency in achieving the set goals. 
 
A wider contribution to legislation impact assessment can be drawn from the approach of 
this paper. By looking at statistical effects correlated to legislation. 
 
3 Methodology 
This chapter has three sections: first, a layout the overarching research design, second, the 
used data together with the sources, and third, an explanation of the applied methods.  
 
3.1 Research design and variables 
The research design specifies the composition of this study. It is the created framework to 
seek answers to the research questions as well as to test the hypotheses mentioned in 
section 1.1. This thesis uses a quantitative research method: sequential multiple 
regression86. A definition of this method is given in the following section 3.3. 
 
This research seeks to generate hypotheses by examining datasets and estimating potential 
relations among the chosen variables. It is also called exploratory research as it starts with 
a (rough) idea about the relation between variables without specific knowledge of the 
direction and strength of that said relation.  
 
The linear regression model can be described as a straight line (function) laid in between 
all observations in a way that summarises best the pattern (spread) of the data.87 The model 
of this research uses the following equation (1)88: 
 
ln_ݎ݈ܽ݅_݂ݎ݄݁݅݃ݐ௜ 	ൌ ln_݂݅݊ݎܽ_݅݊ݒ௜ ൅ ln_ݎ݈ܽ݅_݌ܽݔ௜ሺ൅ܦா௎ ൅ ܦ஽௜௥ଽଵ ൅ ܦோ௉ଶ଴଴ଵ ൅
ܦோ௉ଶ଴଴ସ ൅	ܦோ௉ଶ଴଴଻ ൅ ܦ௥௘௖௔௦௧ଶ଴ଵଷሻ ൅ ݈݊ܧ௜	 
  
                                                
86 The case of one explanatory variable is called simple regression. More than one explanatory variable 
is multiple regression. (This in turn should be distinguished from multivariate linear regression, where 
multiple correlated dependent variables are predicted.) 
87 Field (2009), p.209ff. 
88 Also called single-equation model, see Gujarati (2004), p.5. 
(1) 
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where 
ln_rail_freight  = railway goods transported per year in each EU Member 
State 
   (transformed into natural logarithm = ln) 
ln_infra_inv = public expenditure on railway infrastructure per year and country (ln) 
ln_rail_pax = total inland passenger numbers (ln) 
DEU  = EU membership dummy  
 DDir91  = Directive 91/440/EEC dummy  
DRP2001  = 1st railway package from 2001 dummy  
DRP2004  = 2nd railway package from 2004 dummy  
DRP2007  = 3rd railway package from 2007 dummy 
Drecast2012 = recast of 1st railway package from 2012 dummy 
lnE  = is an unobserved error term (ln) 
i  = country year 
 
This equation presumes that the dependent variable (DV), railway freight, has a linear 
relation with the independent variables (infrastructure investment and rail passengers). 
With the use of a regression analyses this paper tries to identify indications of causal 
relationship between a cause, the railway packages, and its (direct) effect, a (positive) 
change in the railway freight figures. 
 
The dependent and independent variables are continuous variables, these measure 
quantitative values. Dummy or proxy variable(s) are categorical binary (dichotomous) 
variables that take on only the values 0 or 1 to indicate the absence or presence of a 
category that may be expected to shift the outcome. In other words: numeric stand-ins for 
qualitative facts, where 0 means not in effect and 1 means in effect. The error term E is 
sometimes called disturbance and is not taken into account explicitly in the model.  
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Table 1: Summary of the dependent, the independent and the dummy variables 
Variable Type Description Expected 
sign 
Data 
source 
rail_freight Dependent 
(DV1) 
railway goods transported per year in 
each EU Member State  
(in million tonne*kilometre, tkm) 
 ITF 
infra_inv Independent 
(IV1) 
public expenditure on railway 
infrastructure per year and country (in 
Euro) 
+ ITF 
rail_pax Independent 
(IV2) 
total inland railway passengers per 
year 
(in million passenger*kilometre, pkm) 
+ ITF 
DEU Dummy 
 
EU membership in the specific year 
(0 = not member, 1 = member) 
 EC 
website 
DDir91 Dummy Directive 91/440/EEC 
(0 = not in effect, 1 = in effect) 
 EC 
website 
DRP2001 Dummy 1st railway package from 2001 
(0 = not in effect, 1 = in effect) 
 EC 
website 
DRP2004 Dummy 2nd railway package from 2004 
(0 = not in effect, 1 = in effect) 
 EC 
website 
DRP2007 Dummy 3rd railway package from 2007 
(0 = not in effect, 1 = in effect) 
 EC 
website 
Drecast2012 Dummy recast of 1st RP from 2012 
(0 = not in effect, 1 = in effect) 
 EC 
website 
 
3.2 Data panel and sources 
This section presents the used data, their explanation and classification. The two best 
suited data sources for the purpose of this research were EuroStat89 and the International 
Transport Forum (ITF) of the OECD90. Both provide extensive data on railway transport in 
the EU. The ITFstat reaches back until 1975 whereas the EuroStat data starts in the year 
2003. Because this paper wants to explore the effects of the EU legislation on railway 
transport since its beginning in 1991 the ITF dataset was chosen over the EuroStat dataset. 
 
The type of data for this empirical analysis is pooled, that is a combination of cross-
sectional (i.e. data collected at one point in time) and time series (i.e. data collected over a 
period of time). More specific the data is collected in a panel in which a fixed number of 
countries are recorded in several variables (see section before) every year. Please see tables 
6 and 7 in the appendix for the data and variable view in the SPSS programme. 
 
                                                
89 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=rail_pa_typepkm&lang=en (acc. 25 Jan 2015). 
90 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ITF_GOODS_TRANSPORT# (acc. 30 Jan 2015). 
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Of the 28 EU Member States five were sorted out. Malta and Cyprus do not have 
railways,91 while Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg have only a small rail freight sector 
(less than 1,000 million t*km per year).92 Consequently the sample of the analysis (subset 
of the population of 28) is 23 EU countries during the time span from 1988 until 2013 (26 
years). The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia (Czech Republic), 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom.  
 
The unit of analysis is ‘country years’, that is per country and year one value for each 
variable (the recorded data entries); thus 23 annual observations. In total 598 observations 
per variable (23 observations per year times 26 years). But the dataset is not complete, 
often whole years of data entries are missing or single countries do not have a figure in a 
specific year. These omissions do not pose a problem because the total amount of 
calculable cases is still high enough and compensates the missing values. 
 
The chosen timeframe (1988 – 2013) reflects the time span from the first railway reforms 
in Sweden in 1988 and includes three years before the first European legislation addressing 
the European railway market (Directive 91/440/EEC) in 1991, to be able to monitor an 
before and after effect, until the latest available data on railways. 
 
The unit of measurement of the DV rail_freight is tonne-kilometre, abbreviated as t*km, 
which represents the transport of one tonne of goods (including packaging) by a 
given transport mode over one kilometre. Similarly the IV rail_pax is measured in 
passenger-kilometre, abbreviated as pkm, representing the transport of one passenger by a 
defined mode of transport (here rail) over a distance of one kilometre. The transport 
mode refers to the way in which passengers and/or goods can be transported (car, bus, 
train, ship, etc.). The IV infra_inv is measured in public expenditure on railway 
infrastructure per year and country (in Euro).93 
 
Considering that the chosen DV and IVs are quantitative the level of measurement 
(abstraction) for each of them is ‘Ratio scale’.94 Ratio scale means the difference between 
two values (the ratio) of a variable is meaningful and there is an absolute (unique and non-
arbitrary) zero value. 
 
                                                
91 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Passenger_transport_statistics (acc. 8 Apr 15) 
92 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ITF_GOODS_TRANSPORT#: 
93 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary (acc. 8 Apr 2015). 
94 Gujarati (2004), p.16. 
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3.3 Methods 
This paper, as mentioned above, uses quantitative research methods. First, descriptive 
statistics and frequency distribution (histograms) are presented; and second, a sequential 
multiple regression analysis, which tries to determine how much of the variation in the 
dependent variable (railway freight) can be explained by each the independent variables 
(model 1), the EU membership (model 2) and the railway packages (model 3). The 
advantage of a sequential or hierarchical multiple regression is the possibility to enter the 
IVs and Ds into the regression equation in an order of choice. This allows to: (a) control 
for the effects of covariates on the results; and (b) take into account the possible causal 
effects of IVs when predicting a DV. The sequential multiple regression uses the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method for constructing the regression line (model) in a given data set.  
 
The relative, unique contribution of each independent and dummy variable towards the 
total can be calculated.95 Thereafter the statistical significance of the overall model and of 
each IV and D is calculated; concluding with a measure of the effect size.  
 
The regression includes a correlation analysis, which measures the strength of linear 
association between two variables and is expressed as a coefficient. A linear regression 
needs a continuous DV and a continuous IV; whereas a multiple regression, a regression 
with more than one IV, can include categorical IVs or dummies.  
 
To make sure the regression provides valid and reliable results the following assumptions 
must be observed: 
1) Normal distribution of DV and IVs 
2) Independence of observations 
3) A linear relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable 
4) Homoscedasticity of residuals (equal error variances) 
5) No multicollinerarity 
6) No significant outliers or influential observations  
7) Normal distribution of residuals 
 
Assumption 1) is checked in section 4.1 and the assumptions 2) till 7) are checked in 
section 4.2. 
 
These assumptions will (1) provide information on the statistical significance of the 
regression, (2) test how well the regression model fits the chosen data, (3) determine the 
                                                
95 https://statistics.laerd.com (acc. 23 Jul 15). 
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variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent/dummy variables, and (4) 
test the hypotheses H0 and H1 against the regression equation.96 
 
The terms errors and residuals in a regression are two closely related and easily confused 
measures of the deviation of an observed value in a data set from its "theoretical or 
predicted value". The error (or disturbance) of an observed value is its deviation from the 
(unobservable) population or general mean, and the residual of an observed value is its 
deviation from the calculated value of the sample or specific mean. The sign of the 
deviation (positive or negative), reports the direction of that difference (the deviation is 
positive when the observed value exceeds the reference value). The magnitude of the value 
indicates the size of the difference. 
 
The calculations of this study were conducted with the computer software SPSS from IBM, 
a widely used programme for statistical analysis in social science. 
 
4 Operationalisation and empirical data 
This part conducts the sequential multiple regression and presents its results: first, a 
quantitatively description of all variables; and second, determining statistical significance 
with the findings of the regression. Tables and figures were moved to the appendix (section 
IV) for a better reading experience. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In order to run a multiple regression it requires a continuous dependent variable (DV) and 
two or more independent variables (IVs); these need to be continuous or categorical. DV 
and IVs are continuous in model 1 and 2. Dummy variables are no precondition but can be 
added.  
 
For descriptive statistics of all variables (including dummies) please see table 8 in the 
appendix. A histogram illustrates the frequency distribution of a variable. Histograms of 
DV1, IV1, IV2 and D1 can be seen in figures 1 till 4. Variables rail_freight (DV), infra_inv 
(IV1) and rail_pax (IV2) do not show a normal distribution curve in their histograms; 
instead they are strongly skewed to the left and have a single sharp peak. Their skewness 
(measure of asymmetry) and kurtosis (measure of peakedness) according to table 8 are not 
close to zero. Skewness: DV1 (2.458), IV1 (2.006) and IV2 (1.790). Kurtosis: DV (6.386), 
IV1 (3.195) and IV2 (2.267). Therefore all three variables need to be log-transformed 
(natural logarithm = ln) to fulfil another precondition of regression analysis, that all 
                                                
96 https://statistics.laerd.com, online statistics tutorial, section: multiple regression (acc. 23 Jul 15). 
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continuous variables need to have an approximately normal distribution. Dummy variables 
are not continuous and therefore do not need to get log-transformed. 
 
After being log-transformed all three new variables (DV: ln_rail_freight, IV1: ln_infra-inv 
and IV2: ln_rail_pax) have a more central position and show an approx. normal 
distribution curve (figures 5 till 7), but have several peaks (polynomial). Their kurtosis 
and skewness values are according to table 9 closer to zero (all ±0.x). Skewness: DV1 
(0.076), IV1 (-0.067) and IV2 (-0.291). Kurtosis: DV1 (-0.444), IV1 (-0.849) and IV2 (-
0.480). 
 
4.2 Inferential statistics – Testing of assumptions 
There were 378 cases (N) for the regression according to table 14. SPSS did not accept 
dummies D2: Directive 91/44/EEC and D6: recast of 1st RP in 2013, it deleted both from 
model 3 (table 15). 
 
Before the coefficient results for the variables and the model fit are presented it is 
necessary to check the assumptions mentioned in the section 3.3. 
4.2.1 Independence of observations 
In order to rule out possible autocorrelation (serial correlation) between residuals 
(prediction error) of adjacent observations in the data set the Durbin-Watson statistics 
should have a value of approx. 2. It has a range from 0 to 4, whereby 0 indicates positive 
autocorrelation, 2 indicates neutral autocorrelation and 4 indicates negative 
autocorrelation. A residual is the difference between the value of an observation and the 
mean value of the same variable. 
 
According to the Model Summary in table 10 the Durbin-Watson for model 3 is 2.515 and 
therefore it can be accepted that there is independence of observations. The Durban-
Watson value was calculated in a separate multiple regression with all variables because 
SPSS produced no value in the sequential multiple regression. The assumption was not 
violated. 
4.2.2 Linear relationship 
The IVs separately and collectively need to be linearly related to the DV for the model to 
work optimal. The IVs collectively are tested by plotting the ‘studentized residuals’ (SRE) 
on the y-axis against the ‘unstandardized predicted values’ (PRE) on the x-axis in a 
scatterplot. Both SRE and PRE were created by the regression. The scatterplot in figure 8 
does not show linear relationship between the collective IVs and the single DV. This 
violation will be neglected for now and later addressed in the weaknesses in section 5.1. 
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Each IV separately plotted against the DV in the partial regression plots show a horizontal 
band of residuals (regular spread pattern) as a sign of linear relationship (figures 9 and 10). 
The categorical dummy variables are ignored in that respect because they are not 
continuous. The assumption was not violated. 
4.2.3 Homoscedasticity 
The assumption of homoscedasticity (homogeneity of variance) is the evenly spread of the 
residuals of the collective IVs on the y-axis over the predicted values of the DV on the x-
axis. For this matter figure 8 will be used again. The spread of the residuals does increase 
and decrease along the y-axis going across the predicted values on the x-axis, which is a 
sign of heteroscedasticity, the opposite of homoscedasticity. This violation will be 
neglected for now and later addressed in the weaknesses in section 5.1. 
4.2.4 Multicollinerarity – independence of the IVs 
Collinearity is a linear association between two variables. Multicollinearity occurs when 
two or more variables are highly correlated with each other. This leads to problems with 
understanding which variable contributes to the variance explained. There are two ways to 
identifying it: inspection of correlation coefficients and Tolerance/VIF values. 
 
The Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables should not be higher than 0.7, 
except between the same variable which has the value 1. As model 3 is the final model 
encompassing all dummies the values of model 1 and 2 are not mentioned here but can be 
seen in table 11. Only IV1 and IV2 have a correlation higher than 0.7 namely 0.844. This 
violation will be neglected for now and later addressed in the weaknesses in section 5.1. 
 
The tolerance value T refers to how much of the variance in one variable is shared with 
another one in the regression analysis. If the tolerance value is 1 none of the variance is 
shared with the other variable. If the tolerance is 0 none of the variance in each IV can be 
considered to be unique. The values for Tolerance (T)/Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) can 
be found in table 12. The values for model 3: Tolerance: ln_IV1 (0.147), ln_IV2 (0.214), 
D1 (0.404), D3 (0.499), D4 (0.327) and D5 (0.536). VIF: ln_IV1 (6.799), ln_IV2 (4.678), 
D1 (2.476), D3 (2.002), D4 (3.054) and D5 (1.867).  
 
Tolerance and VIF can also be calculated using the following formulas: ܶ	 ൌ 	1	 െ 	ܴଶ, 
ܸܫܨ	 ൌ 	 ଵ் 	ൌ 	
ଵ
ଵିோమ. According to table 10 for model 3 R
2 = 0.339. This means T = 1 - R2  
=  1 - 0.339  =  0.661. To calculate VIF we divide 1 by 0.661, VIF = 1.513. The read 
(table 12) and calculated VIFs are below 10 and each Tolerance is above 0.1, this 
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indicates no presence of multicollinearity between the variables.97 The assumption was 
not violated. 
4.2.5 Detecting outliers 
Outliers or extreme observations are data points that can be classified as unfitting the 
regression model (line). Outliers are described with high deviation on the y-axis and high 
leverage on the x-axis. They do not follow the usual pattern and are far away from their 
predicted value. For this reason they need to be detected and removed as they can distort 
the regression results. But the higher the number of cases (observations N) the less 
vulnerable are the results to outliers. 
In a regression the deviations or difference of the dependent variable observations from the 
fitted function (sample mean) are the residuals. 
 
There was no ‘Casewise Diagnostics’ produced by SPSS, which means no observation 
value with a standardized residual of > ±3 is in the data set. According to table 13: There 
were no studentized deleted residuals (SDR) greater than ±3 standard deviations; the 
leveraged values (LEV) of all 378 cases of the regression were less than 0.2 and therefore 
considered safe; the influential points stored as Cook’s Distance values (COO) were all 
< 1, so no case needed to be investigated.98  
 
In addition one can plot SDR against LEV (figure 11), which shows that the leverage (x-
axis) is below 0.2 and the residuals (y-axis) are below 5. The assumption was not violated. 
4.2.6 Normal distribution of residuals (normality) 
To be able to run a regression the residuals of the DV need to be normally distributed, that 
implies that the errors have a mean of zero. The histogram of the standardized residuals of 
DV1 (ln_rail_freight) shows an approx. normal distribution (figure 12). To confirm these 
findings, a Normal P-P Plot of the studentized residuals of DV1 shows too that the 
residuals (circles in figure 13) are closely aligned along the diagonal line indicating an 
approx. normal distribution. The assumption was not violated. 
 
4.3 Reporting the output (results) 
4.3.1 Determining how well the model fits 
There are two measures that can be used to determine how well a regression model fits the 
data: R, R2 and the F-ratio. All values of these measures are provided in the ‘Model 
Summary’ in table 10. 
 
                                                
97 https://statistics.laerd.com, online statistics tutorial, section: multiple regression (acc. 23 Jul 15). 
98 https://statistics.laerd.com, online statistics tutorial, section: multiple regression (acc. 23 Jul 15). 
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The ‘multiple correlation coefficient’ R can be considered to be one measure of the quality 
of the prediction of the DV. In fact it is the correlation between the predicted values and 
the actual values of the DV. R can range in value from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating 
that the predicted values are closer to the actual values. For model 3 a value of R = 0.582 
indicates a medium level of prediction, similar values for model 1 (0.576) and model 2 
(0.578). 
 
R2 or R square (coefficient of determination) represents the proportion of variance in the DV 
that can be explained by the other variables. An R2 near 1.0 indicates that a regression line fits 
the data well, while an R2 closer to 0 indicates a regression line does not fit the data very well. A 
value of R2 = 0.339 means that the two IVs (ln_infra_inv and ln_rail_pax) and the 4 
dummies explain approx. 39.9% of the total variability of the DV (ln_rail_freight). 
Accordingly model 1 explains 33.1 % and model 2 explains 33.4 %. 
 
The F-ratio in the ANOVA (analysis of variation) table (table 16) is the ratio between the 
mean sum of squares for regression and the mean sum of squares for residuals. A good fit 
for the data has a p-value of < 0.05. The table shows that the variables statistically 
significantly predicted the DV, F(6 variables, 371 cases) = 31.703, with p < 0.0005. 
Accordingly ln_infra_inv and ln_rail_pax of model 1 predict the DV, F(2 variables, 375 
cases) = 92.866, with p < 0.0005; and model 2 (model 1 + EU membership) predict the 
DV, F(3 variables, 374 cases) = 62.442, with p < 0.0005. 
4.3.2 Estimated model coefficients B of all accepted variables 
Unstandardized coefficients indicate how much the DV varies because of one independent 
or dummy variable when all other variables are held constant. The greater the coefficient 
of the variable the greater is the effect on the DV. The minus or plus sign indicates a 
positive or negative effect. 
 
The unstandardized coefficients B for each variable can be found in table 12, for model 3: 
Constant (6.148), ln_IV1 (-0.023), In_IV2 (0.423), D1 (-0.242), D3 (0.034), D4 (0.160) 
and D5 (-0.044).  
 
4.3.3 Statistical significance of the independent and dummy variables 
Table 12 reports also the Significance or p-value of the IVs and Ds, for model 3: Constant 
(0.000), ln_IV1 (0.697), In_IV2 (0.000), D1 (0.099), D3 (0.782), D4 (0.274) and D5 
(0.725). If p<0.05, one can conclude that the coefficients are statistically significant. Only 
the constant and IV2 has statistical significance. 
 
MAES│University of Gothenburg Sascha Brose
 
36/65 
 
A summary of the regression coefficients and standard errors can be found in the table 
below. 
 
Table 2: Summary of sequential multiple regression (OLS): Unstandardized Coefficients B 
(SPSS). 
The effect of the European railway packages on railway freight since 1988. 
DV: ln_rail_freight Model 1 (IV1+2) 
Model 2  
(M1+D1) 
Model 3            
(M1+all dummies) 
IV1: ln_infra_inv -.069* -.023 -.023 
 (.042) (.058) (.060) 
    
IV2: ln_rail_pax .443*** .412*** .423*** 
 (.051) (.058) (.060) 
Dummy variables    
D1: EU membership  -.158 -.242* 
  (.134) (.146) 
    
D3: 1st RP   .034 
   (.124) 
    
D4: 2nd RP   .160 
   (.146) 
    
D5: 3rd RP   -.044 
   (.125) 
Constant 6.787*** 6.264*** 6.148*** 
 (.521) (.684) (.697) 
Model fit R2 .331 .334 .339 
Observations N 378 378 378 
Note: Significance *p<0.1 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001, Standard errors within brackets.  
Data: EuroStat and the International Transport Forum (ITF) of the OECD 
 
 
5 Interpreting the output and conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to find a statistical significant impact of the EU’s railway 
legislation, the Railway Packages, on the figures of rail freight in the Member States. More 
specific to determine how much of the variation in the dependent variable (railway freight) 
can be explained by each the independent variables (model 1), the EU membership (model 
2) and the railway packages (model 3). Using the sequential multiple regression allowed to 
add sets of variables to a regression equation and determine how much each set of 
variables uniquely adds to the explanation of the variation of the dependent variable, 
readable as increase in R2 (the variance explained in the dependent variable). These sets 
were added to the regression equation in a fixed, sequential order. 
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Model 3 was the full and final model encompassing all variables. It had the best fit in the 
data with R2 = 0.339, explaining 33.9 % in the variance of DV rail_freight. But alone the 
two IVs (infra_inv and rail_pax) explained already 33.1 % (M1), leaving only 0.3 % for 
EU membership, and similar small 0.5 % for the railway packages. Within this research 
model the PRs contributed only a fraction to the variance of the DV. In general, R2 was 
low, indicating that the regression line (model) did not fit the data very well.  
 
Looking at table 2 and comparing the unstandardised coefficients of the variables it is clear 
that the IV2 rail_pax has the biggest positive impact on the DV with a high significance, 
followed by the EU membership dummy with the biggest negative impact but a low 
significance. Of the three RPs dummies the second RP has the strongest impact, but all 
lack any statistical significance. The same is true for the impact of IV1 infra_inv. 
Therefore one can conclude that the effect of the RPs on rail freight were only marginal 
and negligible. Considering this: the null-hypothesis H0 is confirmed and the alternative 
hypothesis H1 is rejected. 
 
One can try to explain the results by saying that of course the EU membership has more 
weight than each RP because member states have to implement EU legislation anyways. 
The relation between rail freight and rail pax is less clear and it is hard to explain why it is 
the strongest. There is no streight connection between more train passengers and rising 
freight numbers. Therefore it is highly plausible to be a fault of the research model. For 
example the correlation coefficients between IV1 and IV2 were too high. 
 
The quality of the prediction of the DV remained stable in all three models, ranging from 
0.576 (M1) over 0.578 (M2) to 0.582 (M3). This indicates a medium quality of predicting 
values closer to the actual values. 
 
The results of this paper could be taken as an indicator of lack of impact on the ground. 
The current negotiations on the fourth RP may take into account these results in order to better 
apply and specify the rules concerning rail freight. 
 
Referring back to the literature review in section 2 one could have expected the following 
trends- 
 
5.1 Weaknesses and problems 
The biggest weakness was the three violations of the regression assumptions. That is why 
the results of this thesis should be handled with caution. First the linear relationship 
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between the IVs and the DV was violated. Second there was heteroscedasticity between the 
IVs and the DV (figure 8). Third the Pearson correlation coefficients between IV1 and IV2 
was higher than 0.7 suggesting multicollinerarity. Despite these violations the research was 
carried on because all forms of variable transformation (log) had been already used. 
 
With the chosen research model and method it was not possible to detect a before and after 
effect on rail freight, in order to take into account the impact of the first EU legislation on 
railway liberalisation. 
 
Especially infra_inv had big data gaps, before 1995 and after 2011, but it was the best data 
available. Otherwise more cases than 378 could have been used in the regression. 
 
5.2 Suggested further research and outlook 
The limited results and conclusions of this paper still hold valuable information that could 
be used in the impact assessments of European legislation on the railway market. 
 
The fourth RP is in the making,   
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Table 3: Inland passenger transport modal split in 2012 for Europe, from highest rail share to lowest (blue bar). 
Source: EuroStat, Statistical Pocketbook 2014.
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Table 4: Evolution of the European railway landscape from pre-1990 to post-2010. 
Source: Marc Laperrouza and Matthias Finger (2009) Regulating Europe’s single railway market - 
Integrating performance and governance, p.7.
Table 5: Rail sector restructuring forms (MS examples were added by author). 
Source: Chris Nash and Cesar Rivera-Trujillo (2004) Rail regulatory reform in Europe – 
principles and practice, p.15. 
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Table 6: Variable view of ‘country year – time series data panel’ on EU railway goods and railway 
packages 
Source: SPSS
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Table 7: Data view of ‘country year – time series data panel’ on EU railway goods and railway 
packages 
Source: SPSS
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics of all variables 
Source: SPSS
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Figure 1: Histogram of DV rail_freight including normal distribution curve (blue) 
Source: SPSS 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of IV1 infra_inv including normal distribution curve (blue) 
Source: SPSS 
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Figure 3: Histogram of IV2 rail_pax including normal distribution curve (blue) 
Source: SPSS 
 
Figure 4: Histogram of dummy EU, as example for all other dummies 
Source: SPSS 
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 DV1: rail freight 
IV1: rail infrastr. 
invest. IV2: rail pax ln_DV1 ln_IV1 ln_IV2
N Valid 584 378 586 584 378 586 Missing 14 220 12 14 220 12 
Mean 18219.13 1377102174.90 16426.40 9.29 19.71 8.82 
Std. Error of 
Mean 886.800 111562518.729 888.010 .042 .094 .061 
Median 11106.00 358346002.00 7282.00 9.32 19.70 8.89 
Mode 1757a 20000000a 15400 7a 17a 10 
Std. 
Deviation 21430.491 2169023266.637 21496.444 1.024 1.827 1.479 
Variance 459265933.0054704661931211801600462097108.9461.048 3.338 2.189 
Skewness 2.458 2.006 1.790 .076 -.067 -.291 
Std. Error of 
Skewness .101 .125 .101 .101 .125 .101 
Kurtosis 6.386 3.195 2.267 -.444 -.849 -.480 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis .202 .250 .202 .202 .250 .202 
Range 120641 10171001044 92263 4 8 6 
Minimum 1563 3803956 177 7 15 5 
Maximum 122204 10174805000 92440 12 23 11 
 
Figure 5: Histogram of DV ln_rail_freight including normal distribution curve (blue) 
Source: SPSS 
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of rail_freight, infra_inv and rail_:pax before and after being 
log-transformed 
Source: SPSS 
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Figure 6: Histogram of IV1 ln_infra_inv including normal distribution curve (blue) 
Source: SPSS 
 
Figure 7: Histogram of IV2 ln_rail_pax including normal distribution curve (blue) 
Source: SPSS 
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Table 10: Model Summary of the sequential multiple regression 
Mode* R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error
of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square 
Change 
F 
Change
df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .576 .331 .328 .811 .331 92.866 2 375 .000 - 
2 .578 .334 .328 .811 .003 1.398 1 374 .238 - 
3 .582 .339 .328 .811 .005 .975 3 371 .404 2.515** 
Model 1: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1 
Model 2: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1, Dummy 1: EU Membership 
Model 3: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1, D1, D3: 1st railway package in 2001, D4: 2nd RP in 
2004, D5: 3rd RP in 2007; D2 and D4 were excluded by SPSS 
*Dependent Variable: ln_DV1 
**Value calculated in a separate multiple regression 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Scatterplot of SRE against PRE for testing linear relationship and homoscedasticity 
between collective IVs and DV 
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Figure 9: Scatterplot of ln_DV1 against ln_IV1 for testing linear relationship 
 
Figure 10: Scatterplot of ln_DV1 against ln_IV2 for testing linear relationship 
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Table 11: Correlation coefficients and their significance of all variables 
 ln_DV1ln_IV1ln_IV2D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 
Pearson  
Correlat- 
ion 
ln_DV1 1.000 .446 .571 .118 . -.012 .003 -.015 . 
ln_IV1 .446 1.000 .844 .629 . .130 .134 .134 . 
ln_IV2 .571 .844 1.000 .343 . -.058 -.035 -.022 . 
Dummy 1: EU 
Membership .118 .629 .343 1.000. .284 .430 .338 . 
D2: Directive 
91/440/EEC . . . . 1.000. . . . 
D3: 1st railway 
package ‘01 -.012 .130 -.058 .284 . 1.000.686 .464 . 
D4: 2nd railway 
package ‘04 .003 .134 -.035 .430 . .686 1.000.676 . 
D5: 3rd railway 
package ‘07 -.015 .134 -.022 .338 . .464 .676 1.000. 
D6: recast of 1st RP in 
2013 . . . . . . . . 1.000
Signifi-
cance  
(1-tailed) 
ln_DV1 . .000 .000 .011 .000 .410 .479 .386 .000
ln_IV1 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .006 .005 .004 .000
ln_IV2 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .131 .249 .338 .000
D1 .011 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
D2 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000
D3 .410 .006 .131 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000
D4 .479 .005 .249 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000
D5 .386 .004 .338 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000
D6 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
N ln_DV1 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
ln_IV1 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
ln_IV2 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
D1 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
D2 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
D3 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
D4 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
D5 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
D6 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
Model 1: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1 
Model 2: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1, Dummy 1: EU Membership 
Model 3: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1, D1, D3: 1st railway package in 2001, D4: 2nd RP in 
2004, D5: 3rd RP in 2007; D2 and D4 were excluded by SPSS 
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Table 12: Coefficients of all accepted variables 
Model* 
Unstand. 
Coefficients 
Stand. 
Coeff. 
t Sig.p 
95.0% Confid. 
Interval for B Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
Zero-
order
Partia
l Part 
Toler-
ance VIF
1 
(Constant) 6.787 .521  13.022 .000 5.762 7.812      
ln_IV1 -.069 .043 -.127 -1.615 .107 -.153 .015 .446 -.083 -.068 .287 3.484
ln_IV2 .443 .051 .679 8.613 .000 .342 .544 .571 .406 .364 .287 3.484
2 
(Constant) 6.264 .684  9.163 .000 4.920 7.608      
ln_IV1 -.023 .058 -.042 -.397 .692 -.136 .091 .446 -.021 -.017 .157 6.386
ln_IV2 .412 .058 .632 7.157 .000 .299 .525 .571 .347 .302 .229 4.375
D1 -.158 .134 -.072 -1.182 .238 -.421 .105 .118 -.061 -.050 .481 2.077
3 
(Constant) 6.148 .697  8.824 .000 4.778 7.518      
ln_IV1 -.023 .060 -.043 -.389 .697 -.140 .094 .446 -.020 -.016 .147 6.799
ln_IV2 .423 .060 .649 7.106 .000 .306 .540 .571 .346 .300 .214 4.678
D1 -.242 .146 -.110 -1.655 .099 -.529 .045 .118 -.086 -.070 .404 2.476
D3 .034 .124 .017 .276 .782 -.210 .279 -.012 .014 .012 .499 2.002
D4 .160 .146 .081 1.095 .274 -.127 .447 .003 .057 .046 .327 3.054
D5 -.044 .125 -.020 -.352 .725 -.290 .202 -.015 -.018 -.015 .536 1.867
Model 1: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1 
Model 2: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1, Dummy 1: EU Membership 
Model 3: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1, D1, D3: 1st railway package in 2001, D4: 2nd RP in 
2004, D5: 3rd RP in 2007; D2 and D4 were excluded by SPSS 
*Dependent Variable: ln_DV1 
 
Table 13: Residuals Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 166.07 106288.16 17957.43 18764.949 377 
Std. Pred. Val. -.948 4.707 .000 1.000 377 
Std. Error of Pred. Value 566.992 2173.604 897.439 290.161 377 
Adjusted Pred. Value 143.18 105687.30 17945.71 18732.357 377 
Residual -25793.791 34251.336 .000 8145.234 377 
Std. Residual -3.150 4.183 .000 .995 377 
Stud. Residual -3.165 4.215 .001 1.002 377 
Deleted Residual -26037.119 34788.855 11.716 8273.693 377 
Stud. Deleted Residual (SDR) -3.204 4.314 .001 1.008 377 
Mahal. Distance .805 25.494 3.989 3.897 377 
Cook's Distance (COO) .000 .061 .003 .008 377 
Centered Leverage Value 
(LEV) .002 .068 .011 .010 377 
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Figure 11: Scatterplot of SDR against LEV to detect outliers (extreme observations) 
 
 
 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics of the sequential multiple regression 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation N 
ln_DV1 9.32 .989 378
ln_IV1 19.71 1.827 378
ln_IV2 8.78 1.517 378
Dummy 1: EU Membership .72 .450 378
D2: Directive 91/440/EEC 1.00 .000 378
D3: 1st railway package in 2001 .66 .475 378
D4: 2nd railway package in 2004 .48 .500 378
D5: 3rd railway package in 2007 .29 .456 378
D6: recast of 1st RP in 2013 .00 .000 378
 
 
Table 15: Warnings of SPSS 
For models with dependent variable ln_DV1, the following variables are 
constants or have missing correlations: D2: Directive 91/440/EEC, D6: 
recast of 1st RP in 2013. They will be deleted from model 3. 
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Figure 12: Histogram of the standardized residuals of DV1 (ln_rail_freight)  
with normal distribution curve 
Source: SPSS 
 
 
Figure 13: Normal P-P Plot of the studentized residuals of DV1 (ln_rail_freight) 
Source: SPSS 
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Table 16: ANOVA (analysis of variation) of the regression and residuals 
Source: SPSS 
Model* Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-ratio Sig. = p-value 
1 
Regression 122.161 2 (variables) 61.081 92.866 .000 
Residual 246.648 375 (cases) .658   
Total 368.809 377    
2 
Regression 123.080 3 (variables) 41.027 62.442 .000 
Residual 245.729 374 (cases) .657   
Total 368.809 377    
3 
Regression 125.003 6 (variables) 20.834 31.703 .000 
Residual 243.807 371 (cases) .657   
Total 368.809 377    
Model 1: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1 
Model 2: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1, Dummy 1: EU Membership 
Model 3: (Constant), ln_IV2, ln_IV1, D1, D3: 1st railway package in 2001, D4: 2nd RP in 2004, D5: 
3rd RP in 2007; D2 and D4 were excluded by SPSS 
*Dependent Variable: ln_DV1 
 
Table 17: Timeline of country reforms, EU railway legislation and White papers on transport 
When? What? 
1988 start of the railway reform in Sweden 
29 Jul 1991 ‘mother’ Dir. 91/440/EEC: foundations for a single European railway area 
Dec 1992 Commission’s first White Paper on the future development of the common 
transport policy 
1993 start of the railway reform in the UK 
1994 start of the railway reform in Germany 
1995 follow up directives Dir. 95/18 & 19/EC: licensing companies, allocation 
and charging 
1996 CEC, EC’s White Paper on Railways on “a Strategy for Revitalising the 
Community’s Railways” 
1997 start of the railway reform in France 
Feb 2001 1st Railway Package: aiming to create a single European railway area 
Sep 2001 EC’s White Paper ‘European transport policy for 2010’ 
2004 2nd Railway Package, amending first package 
2004  Creation of the European Railway Agency through the 2nd RP 
2006 EC report on the Implementation of the 1st RP, => COM(2006) 189 
2007 3rd Railway Package 
Aug 2009 DG Tran: Evaluation of the Common Transport Policy (CTP) 
2011 White Paper ‘Roadmap to a single European Transport Area’ 
Dec 2012 Dir. 2012/34 or 44 (?)/EU 
- Recast of 1st railway package (Dir. 2001/12 + 13 + 14/EC) 
- Repeals Dir. 91/440/EEC, Dir. 95/18/EC 
Jan 2013 Impact Assessment of the prospective 4th RP 
since Jan 
2013  
in process: 4th Railway Package: EC => EP + Council in negotiations, 
market and technical pillar 
Feb 2014 partly adoption of 4th RP (technical pillar) by EP  
2013-15 negotiations on market pillar, trialogue (3): EP + EC + Council  
Jul 2015 agreement in trialogue reached on technical pillar 
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Table 18: Overview of European railway legislation (sources: European Commission, EUROlex) 
First step  Second step Third step Fourth step  Fifth step 
1st Railway 
Dir. 
 1st Railway Package 
(RP) 
2nd RP 3rd RP Recast of 1st RP 4th RP  
Nov 198999  1998 Jan 2002 Sep 2004  Jan 2013 
Sep 1991 1995/96 April 2001 Apr 2004 Dec 2007 Nov 2012 in process 
Council 
Directive100 
91/440/EEC 
on the 
development 
of the 
Community's 
railways 
aim: to 
facilitate the 
integration 
process of 
European 
railway 
markets, and 
to increase 
their 
efficiency 
+ instruments: 
- ensuring 
management 
independence 
of railway 
 Dir. 2001/12/EC 
amending/recasting/ 
revising 
Dir. 91/440/EEC on 
the development of 
the Community's 
railways 
- allowed cross border 
freight operations on a 
network of tracks – to 
be called the Trans 
European Rail 
Freight Network 
- which includes ports 
and freight terminals 
- required separate 
accounting of freight 
and passenger service 
revenues and costs 
- separation of 
“essential functions”: 
infrastructure manager 
and transport/train 
Dir. 2004/51/EC 
- amend. Dir. 
91/440  
- includes 
reference to 
the Trans 
European Rail 
Freight Network, 
and future access 
by 2007 for 
licensed rail freight 
operators of all the 
European rail 
network as 
originally 
described in 
directive 2001/12 
- completing the 
internal market in 
rail freight services  
 Repeals 
Directive 
91/440/EEC 
 
Recast 
Dir. 2001/12/EC 
 
 
                                                
99 Date of legislation initiation by the EC until date of proclamation in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
100 A directive is a legal act of the EU, which requires member states to achieve a particular result without dictating the means of achieving that result. A regulation is a 
legal act of the EU that becomes immediately enforceable as law in all member states simultaneously (accord. art. 288 TFEU). 
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undertakings, 
-separating the 
management 
of railway 
operation and 
infrastructure 
from the 
provision of 
railway 
transport 
services 
(separation of 
financial 
accounts), 
- ensuring 
access to the 
networks of 
other MS101 
operator 
 Dir. 95/18/EC102 
- set out a 
framework and 
guidelines for the 
way in which 
countries of the EU 
provide licenses to 
operate railway 
companies; a 
license provided in 
one member state 
Dir. 2001/13/EC 
amending Dir. 
95/18/EC 
- Licensing of railway 
companies in the EU 
  Dir. 2012/34/EC 
- Repeals  
Dir. 95/18/EC 
- Recast 
Dir. 2001/13/EC 
- to allow general 
access to run 
domestic 
passenger 
services – but 
with the 
COM(2013) 
29; 
amending 
Dir. 
2012/34/EC 
 
                                                
101 Eisenkopf (2006), p.298. 
102 Directive 95/18 required states to designate licensing authorities, so that it could be clear that any operator wishing to run international trains had appropriate financial 
capacity, professional qualifications, insurance and safety certification. 
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being generally 
valid in all other 
member states 
possibility to 
limit access 
when the 
economic 
equilibrium 
(viability) of a 
public service 
contract is 
compromised 
    Reg. (EC) 
1370/2007 
- open domestic rail 
passenger markets 
to competition (open 
access) 
- authorities in 
Member States have 
the choice to either 
directly award 
public service 
contracts for rail 
(limited to 15y) or 
organise 
competitive tender 
procedures 
(subsidised public 
services) 
 COM(2013) 
28; 
amending 
Reg. (EC) 
1370/2007 
- “market 
pillar” 
- make 
competitive 
award of 
public 
service 
contracts for 
railways 
mandatory 
 Dir. 95/19/EC103 
- set out the 
framework for the 
Dir. 2001/14/EC 
amended Dir. 
95/19/EC 
  Recast 
Dir. 2001/14/EC 
 
                                                
103 Directive 95/19 required governments to define an infrastructure manager and a path allocation body, and to lay down non-discriminatory rules for the allocation of 
paths and for access charges. 
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construction of 
bodies that control 
and regulate the 
allocation of line 
possessions to 
companies, and the 
charges for using 
the track 
(Railway Safety 
Directive) 
- on capacity (track) 
allocation, railway 
infrastructure (usage) 
charging and safety 
certification 
    Reg. (EC) 
1371/2007 
- International Rail 
Passengers’ 
Rights and 
Obligations 
- rules for the 
compensation of 
passengers in the 
case of train delays, 
limited to cross-
border trips 
  
 Dir. 96/48/EC 
- on 
interoperability of 
the trans-European 
high-speed rail 
system104 
Dir. 2001/16/EC 
- standards for 
interoperability of rail 
systems 
- long-term goal of 
common European 
rolling stocks 
- is dedicated to the 
implementation of 
common technical 
Dir. 2004/50/EC 
- amended Dir. 
96/48/EC and 
2001/16/EC 
- harmonised 
interoperability 
requirements, 
particularly for 
high-speed rail.  
Dir. 2007/57/EC 
- amended Dir. 
2004/50/EC 
- interoperability of 
the rail system 
within the 
Community 
 COM(2013) 
30; 
recasting  
Dir. 
2007/57/EC 
                                                
104 Jarzembowski (2006), p.299. 
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specifications to 
achieve the 
interoperability of rail 
services in Europe 
on the Trans-
European 
Conventional Rail 
Network 
    Dir. 2007/58/EC105 
- open access 
services proposed 
by private 
companies 
- "International 
passenger service" 
shall mean a 
passenger service 
where the train 
crosses at least one 
border of a Member 
State and where the 
principal purpose of 
the service is to 
carry passengers 
between stations 
located in different 
Member States.' 
  
    Dir. 2007/59/EC 
- harmonised 
  
                                                
105 The rapid expansion of cheap air travel across Europe has had a serious impact on the rail business, and Directive 2007/58 - which is the legal basis in the Third 
Railway Package for opening up of the market - mentions 'strong competitive pressure from low-cost airlines', noting that 'it is therefore essential to stimulate new 
initiatives by promoting competition between railway undertakings'.  
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licenses for train 
drivers 
   Reg. (EC) 
881/2004 
(Agency 
Regulation) 
- establishment of a 
European Railway 
Agency (ERA)  
- a effective 
steering body to 
coordinate across 
the MS the 
development of 
safety standards 
and the technical 
specifications 
for interoperability 
efforts  
  COM(2013) 
27; 
replacing 
Reg. (EC) 
881/2004 
   Dir. 2004/49/EC 
- ‘Railway Safety 
Dir.’ 
- common safety 
targets on the 
Community's 
railways, common 
safety methods and 
indicators for the 
ERA 
- It harmonised 
safety principles, 
including 
Directive 
2008/110/EC 
- amend. Dir. 
2004/49/EC 
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procedures for 
granting safety 
approval to railway 
operators and 
infrastructure 
owners 
  Dir. 2001/34/EC 
(“Recast”) 
    
      COM(2013) 
26; 
repealing 
Reg. (EEC) 
1191/69* 
=> “technical 
pillar” 
      COM(2013) 
31; 
amending 
Dir. 
1191/69/EC 
First step  Second step Third step Fourth step  Fifth step 
1st railway 
Dir. 
 1st RP 2nd RP 3rd RP Recast of 1st RP 4th RP 
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